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Early in their paper, MargaretJane Radin and Frank Michelman
take a stance: "We do not agree ...

that it is especially helpful as

part of the effort to advance an understanding of legal thought's
situation and prospects... to name 'normativity' as legal thought's
crucially problematic characteristic." 1 Not only do they conceive
of their own intellectual project as taking a stance, but "stance" is
one of the major metaphors organizing their conceptualization of
the jurisprudential field. Hence, they say: "Postmodernists, we
think, are committed ...

to the view that at any moment some

stance must be privileged .... . 2 In this sentence, the metaphorical
logic of stance is already doing its rhetorical work even before we
reach the word "stance." Both in the claims that postmodernists
"are committed" and that they are committed to a "view," there is
already a logic that constructs postmodernists as persons who take
stances.
For pragmatists, this metaphorical prefiguration of the field of
jurisprudence as a collection of stances is in some senses quite
congenial. Implicit in-indeed, embodied in-the metaphor of stance
are the notions of orientation and of attitude. By conceiving of the
various jurisprudences as stances, we are able to take note of the
character of their (jurisprudential) orientations or attitudes. The
focus on orientation leads the pragmatist to evaluate each jurisprudence for its likely practical and wordly implications. The focus on
attitude enables and activates the perspectivist moment in critical
pragmatism-what Radin and Michelman call the commitment to
"watchful receptiveness to redescription."3
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1 Radin & Michelman, PragmatistandPoststruwturalistCriticalLegal Practice,139 U.
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2 Id. at 1029-30 (emphasis altered).
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But the conventional metaphorics of the logic of stance have
another rhetorical entailment that tends to frustrate the critical
perspectivism and the dialogic openness of pragmatism. It is stance
as position. It is this metaphorical entailment that prompts the
question that Radin and Michelman ask of the critique of normativity, of poststructuralism, and of themselves: Where do you stand
to say all this?4 And it is the same metaphoric logic of stance as
position that organizes each part of their response. Hence, Radin
and Michelman worry whether they may already have sabotaged the
inquiry by "(mis)locating poststructuralism ... on a plane with the
others." 5 The answer to this hypothetical objection is "already
contained in the objection's demand for ... an undislodgeable,
privileged privilege." 6 It is "that no privilege is stabilized against
7
dislodgement."
What is interesting here is that the logic of stance has reduced
a dialogue between poststructuralism and pragmatism to an
encounter between two object-form positions in a highly spatialized
and static discursive field.8 And it is precisely this spatialization of
intellectual activity into object-form positions-that is, into stancesthat creates for the pragmatist this problem of privilege:
[T]o insist on a privilege over privileges-would be to restore a

foundation. Poststructuralism, rejecting foundations, here joins
pragmatism: which stance stands as critique and which others stand
as targets is always and strictly a matter of (i) occasion orfocs, and
(ii) perspective or interest; it is not a fixed or stable matter of
conceptual structure or logical inference. 9

What image of the field is prompted by this passage? The field is
occupied by mobile jurisprudential attitudes taking up positionssometimes targeting other positions, sometimes being targeted
themselves.
This way of conceptualizing the field does not resolve the
question of privilege, but rather prompts it: Who will decide
whether the "occasion or focus," the "perspective or interest,"
warrants a poststructuralist or a pragmatic attitude?
See id. at 1021-22.
' Id. at 1029 (emphasis added).
6 Id. (emphasis added).
7 Id. at 1030 (emphasis added).
8 See Winter, Without Privileg4 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1063 (1991).
9 Radin & Michelman, supra note 1, at 1030 (emphasis added and footnote
omitted).
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The problem I want to urge here is not the familiar problem of
undecidability. Rather, I want to suggest that the logic of stancethe very same metaphorical logic that prompts the question of
privilege-has already scripted the answer. The casting of the field
of jurisprudence in the metaphor of stances, of positions, always
and already requires an agent to select and take the stances.
Indeed, implicit in the logic of stance-of standing up, of taking
stances, of separating one's self from the scene ("occasion or focus")
and standing apart from one's own social constructedness ("interest
and perspective")-is the notion of an autonomous individual subject
who chooses his or her own stances.
And so it is no surprise that, operating within what is for them
the originary and organizational metaphor of stance, Radin and
Michelman conclude on the last page of their commentary with the
statement: "We cannot deny our own agency." 10 Within the logic
of stances, a stance-selecting agent is not only rhetorically indispensable; he is already presupposed.
And yet even if one agrees with the statement above, the identity
and the status of each of its critical terms-"We," "cannot," "deny,"
"our," "own," "agency"-are up for further inquiry and specification.
For instance, what is the status of this agent? Is this "agent," this
"We," or this "I," an ontological given? An ideological construction?
A social inscription? An indispensable epistemic necessity? There
is a certain self-referential transitivity at work here: whatever
meaning is invested in the "We," or the "I," becomes the meaning
of the "agency" that we cannot deny. But which meaning is that?
The sentence "We cannot deny our own agency," which at first
seems to be such a strong response to the poststructuralist, does not
resolve the problem. The interesting version of the problem of the
subject is not whether there are subjects, but rather how there are
subjects and what those subjects look like.
By short-circuiting these questions, the metaphorical prescripting of the field as a collection of stances frustrates the
pragmatic project of dialogical openness. Even as it raises an
intractable problem of privilege among competing positions, none
of which can claim foundations, pragmatism hides from itself, its
own pre-scripted, conventional answer. Quite conventionally, the
metaphor of stance can quickly become a kind of closure device that
works to exclude from view any intellectual activity that does not
10Id. at 1058 (emphasis omitted).
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consist in stance-taking. The ultimate risk, of course, is that in a
field of'jurisprudence cast as contentious stance-taking, there simply
will not be room for those jurisprudences that operate differently.
Thus, through its conventional construction of the field as stancetaking, pragmatism risks falling into the complacency that it decries
in its more critical moments.
The metaphor of stance is congruent with and enables another
conventional metaphor that also cuts against the dialogic openness
championed by pragmatism.. Indeed, much of the Radin-Michelman
description of the jurisprudential field is cast in the conventional
metaphor, rational argument is war.11 Hence, not only do legal
12
thinkers take stances, and positions, but we "contend[] against,"
we "sabotage[]," 13 we "quarrel" 14 and have "demobilizing selfsuspicion, " 15 we encounter "assaults" 16 and "targets." 17 But this
way of conceiving discussion (albeit quite conventional)1 8 is not
going to be conducive to the dialogic openness and "watchful
receptiveness to redescription," that pragmatists favor. 19 To the
contrary, it is likely to lead everyone to take up stances and defend
their positions.
If Radin and Michelman have missed the critique of normativity,
it is because they were looking for it in all the wrong metaphorical
places. They were looking for it on ajurisprudentialfield constructed as a collection of stances. To read the critique as a stance is to
read out what it is striving to do-namely, to reveal how the scene
of (normatively charged) stances is itself constructed. In order to
do that, the critique has to displace the grammar of normative legal
thought. As they say, "[S]ometimes it is the most taken-for-granted
20
cultural landscape features that most cry out for redescription."

I" See G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 4-6 (1980).

12 Radin & Michelman, supra note 1, at 1019 (emphasis omitted).
13 Id. at 1029.
14 Id. at
15 Id.

1023.

16 Id. at 1045.
17 Id. at 1030.

18 The rational argument is war metaphor is conventionally embedded and
powerful. See G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 4-6.
19 See Radin & Michelman, supra note 1, at 1051.
20
Id. at 1048.

